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Abstract
This paper analyses UK NHS waiting times and waiting lists for elective surgery
looking at the hospital specialists’ behaviour and the conﬂict of interest these may
face when allowed to practice privately. We look at the relationship between the
government as the health care purchaser and principal of a two-tier hierarchy, and
two hospital specialists, the agents, that deal with elective and emergency treatement.
Specialists are organised in a separated structure, each responsible for only one type
of surgery (either elective or emergency). We formalise specialists’ preferences when
dealing with the two activities. We see how specialists’ interest in the income obtained
with private practice (and altruism) aﬀects negatively (positively) the optimal NHS
numbers treated and increases the waiting time for elective surgery. Asymmetry of
information also has a negative impact on the NHS leading to fewer patients treated or
higher transfers paid. If remuneration is based on performance, transfers have to take
private practice into account. As a result, there may be beneﬁts from extra investment
so as to improve information systems as well as seeking out instruments for nurturing
more altruistic behaviour on the part of the specialists
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11 Introduction
This paper looks at the role that hospital specialists play in managing the UK National
Health Service (NHS) waiting lists. We look at specialists’ activity and the possible conﬂict
of interest they face between the public and the private sector, and investigate how this
aﬀects waiting times for elective surgery.
In the NHS a patient has a ﬁrst appointment with his General Practitioner (GP) after
which, if the GP ﬁnds it necessary, the patient may be referred to a hospital specialist. The
specialist then decides whether the patient should be admitted to hospital. If so, a patient is
either admitted for emergency treatment or put on a waiting list depending on whether the
waiting is critical. The patients whose names are put on a waiting list wait for non-urgent
or elective surgery.
Within the UK, the NHS is the main provider of medical care. It is ﬁnanced by general
taxation with user charges applied to certain services (e.g. dental services). This implies that
provision is mostly free of charge at the moment of consumption. The private sector provides
an increasing amount of non-urgent surgery: around 17% of all elective procedures in the
UK are provided from private sources, an increase from the 4% registered in the 50s (Beeby
et al., 1989; Laing’s, 1994, 1999). The general public spent about £3,287 million on private
health care in 1997, a two-fold increase in real terms since 1975 (Oﬃce of Health Economics,
1999). The increase in private health care expenditure is intimately related to an increase
in the uptaking of private medical insurance (Propper, 1998; Besley et al., 1999; Oﬃce of
Health Economics, 1999, Cullis et al., 2000). According to Besley et al. (1999), around
14-17% of the population (mainly the middle class and the rich) purchases private health
care insurance. Long waits have been seen by the general population as an unsatisfactory
characteristic of the NHS (Bosanquet, 1988) and appear to aﬀect the purchasing of private
insurance (Besley et al., 1999). Indeed, the length of the waits or the lists have been used
by insurance companies to make insurance look more attractive.
Waiting lists are a common feature of markets where the allocation of resources is achieved
by a non competitive money price mechanism. It is sometimes felt that a competitive price
mechanism is not the correct one in terms of equity, for ethical or political reasons, and when
the good is considered a merit good. Hence, several commodities are delivered at a zero or
low price at the point of consumption (Barzel, 1974). That is the case of public health care
systems such as the UK NHS. It is the aim of the UK NHS that inability to pay should
not deter access to medical care. Moreover, a stochastic demand coupled with constrained
capacity implies that not all the patients can be admitted immediately at all times, and
waiting lists are used for planning and smoothing hospital activity if hospitals are working
at full capacity.
Large waiting lists, and the associated long waits for many procedures, have been a
persistent feature of the UK NHS since its inception in 1948. During the ﬁrst twenty ﬁve
years, there were about half a million people waiting for hospital treatment. Since then,
the number of people on the list has increased to around 0.7 million in the 1980s and, after
2a decrease, the number started rising again to around 1 million people at the end of 2000,
despite an increase in capacity (more than 60%) and an 87% increase in the number of cases
treated (Martin and Smith, 1999; Hamblin et al., 1998; Department of Health Web Site,
2000; Cullis et al. 2000). The number of people waiting less than one year has been fairly
constant over time. The number of patients waiting more than one year increased in the
1980s but in the 1990s (due to governmental policies) the number of those waiting more than
a year has seen a great reduction. Patients were waiting an average of 111 days for elective
surgery at the start of 1999 (Martin and Smith, 1999; Department of Health Web Site, 2000;
Cullis et al., 2000).
Interpreted as unmet demand for the services both times and lists have received the
interest of politicians and of the general public. The political debate has led to the im-
plementation of a number of initiatives in order to decrease waiting lists or waiting times
including: the “Waiting List Fund” in 1986, the “Waiting Time Fund” in 1991, which aimed
to reduce a large number of patients waiting a long time, and the “Patients’ Charter” in
1992, specifying the maximum time a patient should wait. More recently, the government
introduced a “Performance Fund” in 1998, rewarding the Health Authorities (HAs) that
would do most to reduce lists and times, as well as an extra funding of £500 million directed
at the reduction of waiting lists. The “Performance Fund” also provided a threat of dismissal
to all non-executive directors of HAs and Trusts if the targets concerning waiting lists were
not attained.
Importantly, waiting lists and waiting times for elective care do not appear to be inde-
pendent from the hospital specialist and the way he manages his list as well as his relation to
private practice. About 70% of senior NHS specialists engage in private practice (Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, 1993). Private practice accounts for about 10% of working time
for full time NHS specialists but the percentage is higher for part-time specialists. Yates
(1995) estimates that on average an NHS surgeon undertakes two operations per week in the
private sector. There is some concern that the pursuit of private practice by NHS surgeons
leads to a conﬂict of interest (Yates, 1987, 1995). For example, an NHS specialist may use
the long waits of the NHS to advise a patient to undertake quicker private treatment which
that specialist may be able to oﬀer. Hence, NHS specialists may have a perverse incentive
to maintain long NHS waiting lists in order to make their private health care appear more
attractive and thus increase their earnings (Yates, 1987, 1995). This perverse incentive is
strengthened by the existence of private insurance coupled with the idea that a long list may
be a sign of a doctor’s prestige and capabilities.
We believe that the analysis that follows contributes to the debate over NHS waiting times
and lists. It does so by using a Principal - Multi Agent approach to study the inﬂuence of
specialists’ private practice on the NHS activity and waiting times, thus adding some more
insights to the political and social debate over specialists’ conﬂict of interest. We discuss
and formalise the motivation and behaviour of hospital specialists within an NHS hospital
deﬁning possible utility functions when in the presence of diﬀerent activities (elective or
3emergency care).
We look at the context where the government, as the health care purchaser, acts as a
principal of a two-tier hierarchy and contracts with two hospital specialists (the agents) so as
to have two tasks accomplished: emergency and non-emergency (elective) patients treated
within an NHS hospital. Hospital specialists are organised in a separated horizontal struc-
ture, that is, each specialist is responsible for only one type of surgery and the government
is able to observe the number of patients treated by each specialist.
We wish to determine the optimal contract that provides the incentives for the specialists
to maximise the government’s expected utility in the context of asymmetric information
when hospital specialists may have an incentive in keeping a certain list length so as to
increase demand for and income from their private practice. We analyse the impact of
having altruistic and/or selﬁsh specialists on the optimal number of patients treated and on
the optimal waiting time.
The next section describes the remuneration system of hospital specialists. We then
proceed by discussing the utility functions of the government and the hospital specialists in
section (3) and solve for the optimal contract in the context where tasks are separated and
information can be symmetric or asymmetric (correlated or non-correlated) in section (4).
We ﬁnalise with a summary and conclusions (section 5).
2 Hospital Specialists’ Remuneration System
The specialists’ remuneration is important because specialists’ decisions aﬀect the use of
hospital and community health services. Hospital specialists are remunerated on a salary
basis using recommended ﬁxed salary scales. They may also be given a distinction award
and engage in private practice. Salaries and wages are the largest single component of
NHS costs (around 62% of the gross annual revenue expenditure with the NHS Hospital
and Community Services) and the cost of awards can be up to tens of millions of pounds.
Private practice may increase specialists’ income by tens of thousands and may create a
conﬂict with the public interest. The possibility of engaging in private practice may provide
a perverse incentive to treat fewer patients in the NHS so as to increase demand for NHS
specialists’ private practice (Bloor and Maynard, 1992, Bloor and Maynard, 1993; Oﬃce of
Health Economics, 1999).
It has also been argued that the system is not eﬃcient because payment is not in any way
related to performance, workload, quality, or health outcome and thus should be reformed
to include an explicit performance related element (Bloor and Maynard, 1992; Bloor et
al., 1992; Frankel and West, 1993). Salaries are ﬁxed and the system of awards is rather
secretive. Awards appear to be based on prestige, international recognition, and on academic
distinction, varying widely with the specialty and region. As such, the current remuneration
system fails to provide a ﬁnancial incentive for specialists to work in areas or specialties of,
perhaps, lower scientiﬁc interest but of interest for the public, and fail to motivate doctors
4who then delegate the non-interesting duties to junior doctors (Bloor and Maynard, 1992).
A salary system has the advantage that it does not encourage unnecessary treatment but a
system of awards could be used to make specialists treat more patients, work more hours,
decrease waiting lists or waiting times. The NHS reforms allowed the Trusts to appoint
their own specialists and set their payments. This perhaps would give an opportunity to
introduce an element of performance related payment. The issues of performance related
payment and the relationship between the state and private sector are in fact the object of
the governmental document “Agenda for Change” (NHS Executive, 1999).
Analysing a possible reform of the system that bases remuneration on performance (pa-
tients treated and waiting times) should be done having in mind that health care is a ser-
vice (e.g. diagnosis and advice), thus heterogeneous and non-retradable, and subject to
information asymmetries (Gaynor, 1994). In the market for health care, there are several
participants that establish diﬀerent relationships between them and have diﬀerent degrees
of information: the state (politicians, government), the general public as citizens and pa-
tients, insurance providers, purchasers (HAs and GP fundholders in the UK case), and health
care providers including hospitals, doctors and other health professionals (Jones and Zanola,
1995). When one of the parties in an exchange has more information than the other, an
agency problem is said to exist (Arrow, 1985). The use of performance related reimburse-
ment schemes whereby an optimal contract is established so as to create ﬁnancial incentives
to attain a certain target may thus look reasonable.
Summarising, hospital specialists may be able to inﬂuence waiting lists and waiting times
for elective surgery as they own and manage their lists. They may have conﬂicting objectives
when in the presence of private practice and private insurance: long NHS lists may increase
the demand for their private practice and consequently their earnings. The presence of
asymmetric information may emphasize the perverse behaviour of specialists.
It is our aim to analyse the behaviour and the possible reimbursement of specialists when
these may not act purely on medical grounds and, as a consequence, may aﬀect the number
of patients treated and the waiting time for elective surgery. With the analysis we hope to
shed some light on how, in the context of elective care, specialists preferences for private
earnings aﬀect NHS activity as well as public transfers when these are performance related
(as appears to be the aim of the English government). Doing so, it is our hope that this
study by may help a more informed policy making process in what concerns elective care.
3 The Utilities of the Government and of the Hospital
Specialists
The research concerning the utility functions of the various participants in the health care
market is ongoing.1 Information on this respect would inﬂuence the type of incentives to give
1Papers include Mooney and Ryan (1993), Lerner and Claxton (1994), and Scott (1996, 1997).
5agents. Given that knowledge on specialists’ preferences is limited, when constructing the
utility functions of hospital specialists we make use of agency theory as well as information
from previous studies and governmental documents concerning hospital specialists’ behaviour
and their private practice.
We start by assuming that there are a number of individuals in need for health care.
Of these potential patients, some need emergency care (and thus constitute the demand
for emergency care, Dy) and some need elective or non-urgent treatment (thus constituting
the demand for elective care, Dx). The demand for elective care is assumed to depend on
morbidity factors, technology, and social attitudes and perceived measures of waiting time
or list (see Hamblin et al. 1998, Iversen, 1997, Gravelle et al., 2000).2
Those treated as elective, x, and those treated as emergency cases, y, obtain a net beneﬁt
from treatment (e.g. QALYs) deﬁned respectively as Qx and Qy. All patients are assumed
to obtain equal beneﬁts from treatment.
Waiting time for emergency treatment is zero (i.e. an individual cannot wait). Hence,
when not all the emergency cases can be treated in a hospital they have to be sent somewhere
else or patients die. In either case, we assume there is a cost present. All those needing
emergency care but not treated are the diﬀerence between total demand and total numbers
treated, (Dy − y), and the unit opportunity cost of not treating these is V y (e.g. the social
loss due to death).
Concerning elective cases, there are those who wait and receive treatment, x, and those
that remain on the list without receiving treatment, (Dx − x). All patients, treated and
non-treated, face an average waiting time on a list, tx, time that delays the reception of
that beneﬁt and decreases the present value of the beneﬁt when received (Lindsay and
Feigenbaum, 1984; Goddard et al. 1995; Martin and Smith, 1999). Hence, delay implies a
cost/loss deﬁned here as V x.
Waiting time for elective care, tx, is deﬁned as the result of the interaction between those
demanding treatment, Dx, and those being treated, x, given a certain capacity attributed
to elective surgery, Kx. Hence, we can write a “technological relationship” that expresses
waiting time as a function of capacity, number of patients treated and total level of demand:
tx = Dx−x
Kx . Kx is ﬁxed and determined a priori (Iversen, 1997).3 The more cases are treated,
2Possible measures of perceived waiting time include the time to clear the list, the proportion waiting
more than three months and one year, and total list, computed using past information (Gravelle et al., 2000).
We believe that it is realistic to think that the actual time in each period is not known to the demanders of
care who have only limited access to information such as past information. As such, the demand for elective
surgery is dependent on a measure of perceived waiting time which is diﬀerent from the measure of actual
waiting time that we look at in this analysis. Therefore, demand can be considered exogenous to the problem
investigated.
3The analysis we conduct in this paper can be seen as one where the government wants to treat both
types of patients, and wishes to achieve a balance in the numbers treated, therefore maximising health gains
for both elective and emergency treatment. An alternative context would be that of having Kele related
to the total capacity of the hospital and thus to the capacity allocated to emergency: Kele = K − Keme.
This formalisation corresponds to the case where the regulator has some prioritising rule treating ﬁrst all the
6the lower is the delay for elective treatment.
The government is assumed to wish to maximise the population’s health (White Pa-
per 1999). With this in mind, we use a broad deﬁnition of a health production function,
H (HC,Z), relating level of health, H, to health care, HC, and to a set of other factors (e.g.
income), Z. For simplicity reasons, the health production function is assumed to be addi-
tively separable in health care and in the set of other factors: H (HC,Z) = H (HC)+H (Z).
The government pays transfers to the specialists, T A and T B, respectively the transfer to
hospital specialist A and the transfer given to hospital specialist B, for the treatment of
both types of patients. Government’s surplus (which corresponds to patients’ surplus)4 ob-
tained with the health care received is given by the diﬀerence between the net beneﬁt of the
treatment and the social cost of taxes, (1+λ), paid to ﬁnance the production of the services.
In order to obtain explicit solutions in the case of this model, we adopt the following








































with i = h,l and j = h,l, that is, when specialists can be of two diﬀerent types: high cost,
h, or low cost, l (see below). QxxA
i + QyyB
j represents the total beneﬁt that patients obtain
from both elective and emergency hospital treatment whilst V x (Dx − xi)tx
i is the total cost
imposed on those not treated, V xtx
ixi is the total waiting cost imposed on those treated and





































i is the total cost of waiting. It can be seen that total beneﬁt increases with
numbers treated but in a decreasing way. The function just presented corresponds to having
emergency cases and then allocating the spare capacity to elective surgery. In that case there is the implicit
assumption that health gains obtained with elective are always lower than those obtained with emergency.
4The government is not maximising a social welfare function which is the sum of the utilities of patients
and specialists, although the government considers the cost of transfers paid for the production of care.
This does not change the results qualitatively (B¨ os, 1994). We follow the aim expressed by the English
government in the White Paper 1999.
5According to Tirole (1988) and Grossman and Hart (1983) very few general results can be obtained in
the absence of speciﬁc assumptions concerning the utility functions of the principal and the agents.
7specialists organised in a separated structure with specialist A treating elective cases and
specialist B doing emergency surgery.
With respect to hospital specialists, it is our intention to consider the possibility that the
length of the waiting list may have a positive impact on the utility of the hospital specialists
because long lists may increase the demand for their private practice. We wish to see the
impact of those preferences on patients treated in the NHS and on the NHS waiting time.
Hospital specialists, when operating in an emergency room, treat the cases as they appear
without any discretionary power to postpone treatment for patients face a life threatening
situation. As such, the treatment of emergency cases does not depend on the will of a
hospital specialist to treat, although the specialist’s knowledge and eﬀort may aﬀect the
number of emergency cases treated. With elective surgery the situation is quite diﬀerent.
Waiting lists for elective surgery are owned by hospital specialists who are directly responsible
for treating the patients on their lists. Given that elective cases are not life threatening
hospital specialists have discretionary power over whom and when to treat and, hence, their
preferences have a direct eﬀect on the waiting time for elective surgery. We assume that
hospital specialists may nevertheless have altruistic attitudes: they may care about the
negative impact that waiting time imposes on patients (if elective) and they care about the
loss due to not treating emergency patients.
Thus, using the insights of Tirole (1988) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), we build the
following utility functions with specialist A dealing with elective care, x, and specialist B
dealing with emergency surgery, y, and with the preferences of specialist A having both a




















































































with i = h,l and j = h,l (where i is the type of specialist A and j is the type of specialist
B). T A
i and T B
j are the transfers received by each specialist and paid by the government,
eA
i and eB
j stand for the eﬀort specialist A and B, respectively, put into the services they
provide to patients, and θA
i and θB
i are random exogenous variables aﬀecting each agent’s
cost (e.g. knowledge or skills and hence, the less skillful or knowledgeable the specialist is,
the higher the cost of producing xi). θ assumes discrete values (high or low) and deﬁnes
whether the specialist has a low, θl, or high cost, θh. It is assumed to follow a known
probability distribution. xA
i and yB
j represent respectively the number of patients treated as
elective and as emergency cases.
6The way we modelled the specialists’ utility functions considers a cost function rather than a production
function. The reason to do this is that we want to address the issue of cost minimisation and namely the














j are the cost functions related to the production of output








2 measure the disutility of eﬀort measured in monetary
terms. τ and ω, with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, represent respectively the degree of
altruism presented by a specialist towards the elective wait and towards those still in need




measures the disutility specialist B attaches to
those not treated as emergency whereas rxA
i can be seen as the disutility hospital specialist
A derives from having that number of patients treated in the public. If r is an average per
patient payment received by the specialist in the private sector, then rxA
i is a proxy for what
hospital specialist A may forego as income were he to treat those patients in the private
sector, that is, the opportunity cost of treating the patients in the NHS.
Another way of looking at the possible ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour of hospital specialists is to
consider that a longer NHS list increases the specialist’s utility because it increases the
































































(1 − ε) (5)
In this context, the specialist perceives that a potential number of those potentially not





(1 − ε), number that is aﬀected by the number
of patients he treats, xA
i . In (5) the more patients a specialist treats in the NHS, the smaller












(1 − ε) is the potential income that the specialist may derive
from his private practice.
Note that when dealing with emergency the specialist does not face any conﬂict of interest
or perverse incentives. As such, emergency is here to allow us to establish the comparison
between diﬀerent and possible activities specialists conduct within the hospital. It allows us
to show that perverse incentives may develop in some but not in other contexts and certain
motivations may arise from external factors, in our case, the possibility of conducting private
surgery.
We assume risk-neutral agents and a risk-neutral principal (where risk neutrality refers
to income).
We now investigate the consequences of having the diﬀerent functions on numbers treated
and waiting times.8
7(1 − ε) is assumed to be exogenous to the model. The literature appears to be ambiguous with respect
to whether the wait aﬀects the demand for private care. Besley et al. (1999) ﬁnds that the waiting list is
positively associated with the purchasing of health insurance whereas Propper (1998) does not ﬁnd evidence
that the demand for private health care is aﬀected by the waiting list. The demand for private care is found
to be related to income and political attitudes as well as to past use of private care.
8In the analysis that follows we take private practice and the number of patients treated in the private
94 Analysing the Impact of Private Practice
We derive the optimal contract for each specialists in three diﬀerent scenarios: ﬁrst, the
symmetric information case, where the government has complete information about special-
ists types, θ, and is aware of their eﬀort, e (subsection 4.1); second, in subsection (4.2), the
situation where hospital specialists have superior information about their type and eﬀort
but information is not correlated (e.g. specialists do not contact with each other in their
activities); third, the context where there is correlation of information (subsection 4.3).
4.1 When Information is Symmetric
In this section, as a benchmark case, we derive the optimal contract between the govern-
ment and the two hospital specialists for the separated treatment of emergency and elective
patients when the government perfectly observes θA and θB. Specialist A is responsible for
elective surgery, x, while specialist B is responsible for emergency surgery, y. They can be
of two cost types measured by the random parameter θ: low cost, θl,or high cost, θh. The
level of outcome achieved by the specialists depends on how costly it is for them to produce
due to their knowledge. Moreover, specialist are required to put eﬀort, e, in the treatment
of patients, and their choice of eﬀort is conditional on the their private information of θ (i.e.
on their cost parameter). We solve for the optimal contract by ﬁrst deriving each specialists’
choice of eﬀort (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993; Tirole, 1988). Each specialist chooses the level of
eﬀort that maximises his utility function given its type.9





































sector as something contrary to the government’ objectives. In our context, the government achieves greater
health gains the greater the number of patients treated publicly. One could think that patients that go
private also obtain health gains that the government could take into consideration. It may be the case,
however, that the gains obtained are outweighed by the costs of an increase in the waiting time for NHS
patients so as to make patients go private (Iversen, 1997). Also, the government may not wish to consider
those gains if it is the rich and upper medium class that beneﬁts from going private (White Paper 1999).
Moreover, in an eﬃciency perspective the government should maximise the number of patients treated with
the resources allocate to the NHS.
9We are not considering the choice of eﬀort to be put in the NHS and in the specialist’s private practice
given a total eﬀort possible. Our aim is to look at the eﬀort put in the NHS and see how it aﬀects numbers
treated and the waiting time. The private practice impacts on the NHS not via eﬀort but as an extra element
in the utility function namely as income foregone. This corresponds to the context where more eﬀort in the
public allows for a better use of the existing ﬁxed capacity whereas in the private sector there is no capacity
or eﬀort constraint.
10with j = h,l. T B
j , θB
j , eB
j , and yB
j are as deﬁned previously. Similarly, for hospital specialist











































i , and xA
i are as before. These expressions for the optimal eﬀorts give us
the ﬁrst best eﬀort.











Given the assumption of full information, the government maximises his utility knowing
that specialist B is of type j and specialist A is of type i, and subject to having specialists’
utility greater or equal to zero, UA
i ,UB
j > 0, that is, the government has to ensure that
specialists remain in activity in every state of the world - limited liability case. Principal -
Agent theory assumes that, in a competitive market for agents, the principal has to make
sure that the utility the agent obtains by working in the activities she wishes is greater than
the agent’s reservation utility, that is, the utility he can obtain by going somewhere else
(Tirole, 1988). In our case, the utility of working in the NHS must be greater than that of
dropping the activity which is assumed to be zero. Thus, we can write the government’s















































j > 0 and U
A






with i = h,l and j = h,l. UB
j > 0 and UA
i > 0 are the individual rationality or participation
constraints (PCs) reﬂecting the fact that the government has to ensure that specialists
participate in production.
Using the expressions of the optimal levels of eﬀort of the specialists as well as the



























































































Given the hypothesis of complete information about the cost types, and given that the
transfers are costly, the participation constraints are binding for all types and for both






















































































































































































is the ﬁrst derivative with respect to yB
j . From these expressions we can obtain the
optimal number of patients treated as elective and emergency cases, which are respectively,










































(1 − ε), the




















i + (1 − τ)(1 − ε)r

(10)
Thus, it can be conclude by looking at (8), (10), and (9) that (see also appendix A.1):
Conclusion 1 The optimal number of emergency patients treated increases with the beneﬁt
from treatment, Qy, and the disutility generated by turning emergency patients down, V y. It
decreases with the marginal cost of production, θB
j .
Conclusion 2 Similarly the number of elective patients treated increases with the beneﬁt
from treatment, Qx, and with the disutility generated by the time spent waiting, V x. The
number decreases with the marginal cost of production, θA
i .
Conclusion 3 The more altruistic the specialists’ preferences, in so far as specialists care
about the cost of waiting or the cost of turning down patients, the higher the number of
patients treated in the NHS.
Conclusion 4 The greater the private income foregone, the smaller the number of NHS
patients treated as elective cases.
Conclusion 5 The greater the preferences of the public for private practice the greatest the
impact of specialists perverse behaviour, that is, the smaller the number of NHS patients
treated
Hence, when the specialist dealing with elective surgery has an incentive to keep lists
long in order to increase demand for private practice the number of NHS patients treated is
reduced. Moreover, a shift in population preferences towards private care may enhance this
perverse behaviour.
The waiting time for elective surgery is deﬁned as the technological relationship tx =
Dx−xA
i
Kx . Using the expression for the optimal number of elective patients treated, xA∗
i , and




It can be seen that:
Conclusion 6 Waiting time is lower the more altruistic specialists are, and it is higher the
greater the impact on specialists’ utility of the income foregone from private surgery or the
greater the preferences for private practice.
13This adds to the claims by Iversen (1997) that private practice leads to a higher waiting
time in the NHS.






































































(1 − ε) (13)
It can be seen that the transfers paid in the NHS depend on the existence of private
practice and on how specialists relate to it.
When specialists care about the private income foregone in the private sector due to
treating the patients in the NHS, as in equation (12), the specialist obtains an increase in
the rent in the public sector. Thus, the transfers paid in the NHS increase when specialists
see in the possibility of treating patients privately an opportunity to increase their earnings.
The rationale is the following: to give an incentive (ﬁnancial) for the specialist to treat those
patients in the NHS and not in the private sector, that is, to control the possible perverse
behaviour of specialists, the government has to increase public transfers so as to compensate
the specialist for what he foregoes due to not treating them in the private sector. To adjust
for the possible perverse behaviour of specialists the government increases the transfers. It
can be concluded that the existence of private practice increases the transfer the government
has to pay to specialists in the NHS and hence increases health care costs.
The case of transfer (13) is one that reﬂects the fact that specialists perceive that a





(1 − ε), and
this number is aﬀected by how many they treat in the NHS, xA∗






being the potential income obtained by treating the potential demand for private practice.
In this context, the optimal transfer scheme suggests that the government should reduce the
state transfers paid to hospital specialists proportionally to what is perceived specialists may
receive outside the NHS by increasing the demand for their private practice. The optimal
transfer is thus a decreasing function of the income received from their private practice.
An alternative system would be to establish a regulatory rule that obliges specialists to
choose the sector (private or public) of their activity. The analysis of this regulatory tool lies
outside the scope of this chapter and is left for future research. We restrict the analysis to
the context where NHS specialists are allowed to practice privately and performance related
remuneration is put in place (which appears to be the intention of the English government).
With a simple setting it can be shown that, independently of the way specialists dealing
with elective surgery internalises their private practice, the latter aﬀects the number of
patients treated in the NHS and thus the waiting time for elective surgery. We formalise
14the diﬀerent motivations (measured by parameters τ and ω) faced by hospital specialists
depending on the task developed, and how these together with their skills/knowledge (θ)
and eﬀort (e) impact on the number of patients treated and on the resulting waiting time
for elective surgery. If the government is to create performance related remuneration and
still allow for private practice it has to be aware that the optimal contract has to take into
account all the elements of the utility of the specialist including the possible income he could
obtain with his private practice. In either context of preferences, we obtain important results
with important policy implications, suggesting that the government may have something to
gain by taking into account private income sources when setting public transfers to hospital
specialists.
4.2 When Information is Asymmetric and Uncorrelated
As said, the health care market is one where asymmetry of information is an important
feature. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that the government has less information than
the specialists: only the specialists know if they have a low or a high production cost,
θl or θh. Consequently, specialists’ compensation can only be based on output and the
government holds expectations over θ. In this situation, besides having to ensure that
specialists participate in the production, the government has to provide the incentives to
induce the specialists to reveal their type (i.e. the incentive compatibility constraints -
ICCs). In other words, the government must design an ex-ante contract that induces the
specialists to produce according to their type. Limited liability is still assumed in place.
When there is no correlation between the agents’ private information, the principal cannot
do better than contract with each agent separately (Demski and Sappington, 1983 and 1984).
In our case, this implies setting a contract with specialist A for the treatment of elective
cases, xA
i , and a contract with specialist B for the treatment of emergency patients, yB
j .
The timing of the contract is as follows: ﬁrst, the realisation of θ occurs and is observed by
the specialists alone; second, the government oﬀers a contract to the specialists specifying
the state-contingent transfers for each possible level of production; third, conditional on
θ, the specialists choose their optimal level of eﬀort; and, fourth, production takes place.
Conditional on the observed numbers treated the specialists receive the agreed transfers from
the government. We further assume that specialists play a non-cooperative Nash game, that
is, they do not collude in their choice of eﬀort or in the revelation of private information.
Specialists’ choice of eﬀort takes place in the same manner as in complete information as













The government maximises health gains establishing a separate contract with each spe-
cialist. Thus, when contracting with specialist A for the treatment of elective patients and

































subject to the individual rationality constraints that guarantee that the specialist receives




















− (1 − τ)rx
A
i > 0,∀i = h,l
and subject to the incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that the specialist prefers










































− (1 − τ)rx
A
q
Note that according to the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979), among all possible
games an agent may choose to play when he privately observes his type, one can restrict the
attention to the class of direct mechanisms in which the agent is induced to truthfully reveal
his own type. Therefore, in our context we have:
Conclusion 7 Each specialist is kept at his reservation level of utility in the high cost state
of the world, θ = θh, while he gains a rent due to his informational monopoly when he is of
a low cost, θ = θl. 11
This corresponds to having for specialist A, with i = h,l:
















































+ (1 − τ)rx
A
h (16)
10Here we just present one type of specialist A preferences. The results with the second type of preferences
are similar and are presented in appendix A.1.
11This result follows from the fact that in the optimal incentive scheme if the agent is in the most productive
state he is indiﬀerent between telling the truth and claiming to be of lower productivity, and in such a context
he chooses the action most preferred by the principal. We check whether these results are veriﬁed using
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) standard approach.
16b) and substituting (15) and (16) into (14) the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the




















































where pl is the probability that we are in the low cost state of the world, θA
i = θA
l .
The optimal number of elective patients treated by hospital specialist A, and for each












































































































































+ (1 − τ)rx
A∗
h (22)
It can be seen that:
Conclusion 8 The ﬁrst best number of patients treated is achieved when specialists are of
a low cost, θ = θl.
Conclusion 9 Due to asymmetry of information the specialist gains a rent if in a low cost
state of the world (e.g. high skills or knowledge when θ = θl). When there is asymmetry of
information and the specialist is of a high cost (e.g. low skills or knowledge) fewer patients
are treated.
17Conclusion 10 Altruistic behaviour has a positive impact on the number of patients treated
and decreases waiting time, whereas the interest on increasing private practice decreases
numbers treated and increases the time spent waiting.
Therefore, asymmetry of information leads to fewer patients being treated or bigger trans-
fers being paid to the specialist, eﬀects that enhance the negative impact already brought
up by private practice.
4.3 When Information is Asymmetric and Correlated
As before, the government has less information than the hospital specialists over their cost
type and eﬀort. However, specialists’ private information, the value of θ, is now correlated
with the joint probability distribution of θ for the two specialists, φij, known. When the sign
of the correlation is known, the principal can use some information on one agent to derive
the type of the other agent and design a contract accordingly. Specialists are still assumed
to play a non-cooperative Nash game.
The choice of eﬀort takes place in the same manner as in the complete information case













As previously, the government maximises health gains and has to ensure that the spe-
cialists participate in the production and provide the incentives to induce them to reveal
their cost type. Following the formulation proposed by Demski and Sappington (1984), the





























































s.t. PCs and to ICCs
where φij indicates the joint probability that θA
i = h,l and θB
j = h,l, and takes four values:
φll when θA
l and θB
l ; φlh when θA
l and θB
h ; φhl when θA
h and θB
l ; and φhh when θA
h and θB
h .
Using the optimal eﬀort levels we have:

















































































































− (1 − τ)rx
A
ql
∀j,k = h,l and j 6= k,and ∀i,q = h,l and i 6= q and j 6= k.
As in Mas Colell et al. (1995), we deﬁne the above expressions for the incentive com-
patibility constraints as “ex-post” since the contract is oﬀered by the Principal after each
agent has learned his type and that of the other agent as well. Yet, in the organisation we
are studying, we assume that there is no form of collusion between the two agents, so that
the fact that they observe each other’s type before private information becomes publicly
revealed does not have an impact on the form of the incentive compatibility constraints that
each agent faces in the optimal contract.12 As a consequence,
Conclusion 11 The optimal contract for each specialist has the participation constraints
binding in the high cost state of the world, for every realisation of the other specialist’s
private information. In the low cost state, the incentive compatibility constraints are binding
at the optimum, for each specialist and for every realisation of the other specialist’s private
information. Numbers treated are decreasing in the cost. 13
















































+ (1 − τ)rx
A
hj (25)
12Alternatively, if the agents could not observe each other’s type, we would have used “interim incentive
compatibility constraints” (Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983). Interim ICCs imply that the optimal contract is
derived after each agent “has learned his type but before the agents’ types are publicly revealed” (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995) so that each agent guesses the other agent’s type. They capture the fact that for every expected
type of the other agent, each agent is at least as better oﬀ by telling the truth about his type than lying.
Therefore, the ICCs hold in expectation for every value that the other agent’s private information may take.















































Hence, both specialist B and specialist A are kept at their reservation level in the high cost
state, whatever the value of the other specialist’s cost state. In the low cost state of the








Substituting (24), (25), (26), and (27) into the utility function of the government as in
(23) and computing the ﬁrst-order conditions we have:

























































































































































































Conclusion 12 In the low cost state of the world, each specialist treats the ﬁrst-best level
of patients, for every realisation of the other specialist’s cost level.
20Conclusion 13 In the high cost state of the world, each specialist treats a sub-optimal num-
ber of patients. The departure of the level of production from the ﬁrst best depends however
on the correlation between the two random variables, θB
j and θA
i .




































φhh when σ < 0
where σ indicates the covariance between the two random variables.
It is important to note that when specialists private information is correlated, the well
known trade-oﬀ between incentives and eﬃciency (or between incentives and rent-extraction)
in the optimal contract assumes diﬀerent features. For example, when specialist B is a high
cost type, and specialist A a low cost one, then specialist B will produce more output when
the covariance between θB
j and θA
i is positive then when it is negative. As a consequence,
in the former case the Principal obtains a higher number of patients treated (i.e. closer
to the ﬁrst-best level), while in the latter one he obtains a lower level of patients treated
(i.e. more distortion from the ﬁrst-best level). On the other hand, since the informational
rent that the Principal leaves to the specialist in the low cost state depends on the level
of patients the specialist is asked to treat in the high cost state, it follows that when the
optimal contract implements a higher level of patients to be treated in the high cost state,
the Principal has to leave a higher informational rent to the specialist in the low cost state.
Hence, in the contract for specialist B, the conﬂict between optimal provision of incentives,
on the one hand, and eﬃcient rent extraction, on the other, are exacerbated when the two
random variables, θB
j and θA
i , are positively correlated. Similar considerations can be drawn
for specialist A.
Note that the second-best levels of both elective and emergency services depend on the
ratio
φli
φhi, and that the smaller the ratio
φli
φhi, the smaller will be the distortions from the
ﬁrst-best levels. In fact, if strong positive correlation is in place so that limφhh,φll → 1, and
limφlh,φhl → 0, it follows that the departures from the ﬁrst-best level will be lower.
Using the insights of Sappington and Demski (1983), it can be seen that when correlation
between agents’ private information is perfect the ﬁrst best numbers of patients treated are
obtained. For example in the case of known perfect positive correlation which implies that
φhh,φll = 1 (i.e. both specialists are either of a high cost or of a low cost) and φlh,φhl = 0,
21the optimal number of patients treated in this case is equal to the optimal number of patients








































































This is due to the fact that, when private information is known to be perfectly positively
correlated, the number of PCs and ICCs, and thus the number of optimal transfers and ﬁrst
order conditions, is reduced from four to two cases per specialist so that only the above cases
are obtained. Similarly for when information is perfectly negatively correlated so that
Conclusion 14 When information is asymmetric but the specialists costs variables are per-
fectly correlated, and the government knows how the types relate, then he can devise a contract
that extracts any possible rents due to the asymmetry of information and can implement the
ﬁrst-best levels of outputs.
Summarising, information asymmetries can enhance the negative behaviour of specialists
leading to higher transfer being paid by the government or fewer patients treated. Altruistic
and ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour have respectively a positive and negative impact on the number of
patients treated and ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour increases waiting time for elective surgery. If it is
possible for the government to obtain better information on how specialists’ capabilities
relate to each other then the negative impact of asymmetry of information may be reduced.
5 Conclusions and Policy Discussion
This paper looked at the role hospital specialists play in managing the UK NHS waiting
lists, and the eﬀect of their behaviour in determining numbers treated and waiting times for
elective surgery when perverse incentives may be in place.
In the NHS UK specialists may be able to inﬂuence waiting lists and waiting times for
elective surgery as they own and manage those lists. In such a context, the possibility of
conducting private elective activity, which often more than duplicates their earnings, may
create perverse incentives not observed in other activities such as emergency surgery which
22in the paper serves as a term of comparison. When dealing with elective surgery specialists
may have conﬂicting objectives in that a longer NHS waiting list and time may contribute
to increase the demand for their private practice, and thus their earnings. They may have
the incentive to treat fewer NHS patients. It is also argued that the current remuneration
system does not contribute to increase production and/decrease NHS waiting times or lists,
and the introduction of some element of performance related payment in the wage structure
is currently being discussed by the English government. Hence, the relevance of this study.
Using a Principal - Multi Agent framework, we analysed the relationship between the
government, as the health care purchaser and the principal of a two-tier hierarchy, and two
hospital specialists that accomplish two tasks separately: elective and emergency surgery.
We explored the motivation of both the government and the specialists and analysed the
impact of altruistic and ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour by specialists on the number of patients treated
and waiting times.
The presence of altruism increases the number of patients treated because more attention
is paid to the disutility generated by turning emergency patients down or to the disutility
generated by the time spent waiting by elective patients. The presence of ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour,
that is, the perverse interest specialists have in the income they can obtain from their private
practice was found to lead to: a) a decrease in the optimal number of patients treated as
NHS elective surgery cases; and b) an increase the waiting time NHS elective care patients
face. Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information helped emphasizing the perverse
behaviour. Asymmetry of information (which a reasonable hypothesis in the context where
the government contracts with specialists) implied that a greater transfer had to be paid to
the high skills specialist so as to have the ﬁrst best number of patients treated, or led to
fewer patients being treated.
Moreover, ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour when dealing with elective care led to an increase in health
care costs due to an increase in the state transfers that the government had to pay so
as to provide a ﬁnancial incentive for specialists to treat more patients within the NHS.
Otherwise, and if information on private practice is available a reduction in the transfers
paid to specialists proportional to what they obtain with their private practice must be put
in place.
We believe these are very important results with important policy implications, namely
that if remuneration of NHS specialists is to be in some way dependent on their levels of
NHS activity, then
a) Remuneration should take into account the level of income the specialist might receive
from private practice. Thus, the government should created the means to obtain information
on the specialists’ private earnings.
b) The existence of imperfect information on the part of the government implies the need
for higher payments to specialists. Therefore, there may be beneﬁts for investing in improved
information systems on specialists’ workload within the NHS.
c) The presence of altruism on the part of specialists leads to increased levels of production
and decreased waiting times under all types of organisation. There is therefore a case for
23seeking out instruments for nurturing more altruistic behaviour on the part of specialists.
We believe that this analysis contributed to the debate over waiting times and waiting
lists within the NHS. It used a Principal - Multi Agent approach to study the inﬂuence
of specialists’ private practice upon the number of patients treated in the NHS and NHS
waiting times for elective surgery. We formalised and analysed how diﬀerent motivations on
the part of specialists when dealing with diﬀerent activities, as well as their skills/knowledge
and their eﬀort inﬂuenced the number of NHS patients treated and the waiting time patients
faced. We believe that with this study we added some more insights into the political and
social debate over the presence of perverse incentives in specialists behaviour which is at the
centre of recent governmental discussion on the reform of NHS specialists’ remuneration. We
hope to have contributed to the development of a better informed policy making process.
A number of issues are left for future research and shall be tackled in time. They include:
having a hospital manager as the principal (which may have more information then the
government); comparing the separation of tasks with a multitask organisation; analysing
the case of having a vertical organisation where the government contracts with a hospital
manager that then contracts with a specialist; and ﬁnally considering specialists cooperation
or collusion in their activities.
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A Appendix
A.1 Some comparative statics
We can derive some comparative statics on the optimal numbers treated that are as follows,
with i = h,l and j = h,l:








































































































































∂ (1 − ε)
= −
2(1 + λ)(1 − τ)r
(1 − λ)
< 0;
And the signs are as expected.
A.2 The alternative interpretation of specialist A preferences
When in the context of asymmetry of information and with the ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour deﬁned










































































































































B.1 Proofs of Binding Constraints in the Optimal Contract
We solve the problem for the case in which specialist A observes that specialist B is of a low
cost type. Looking at the constraints relevant to the transfers to specialist A, for the case
in which the specialist B is in the eﬃcient state of the world, i.e. when θB = θB
l , the ICC
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hl ≥ 0
The ICC in the low cost state of the world and the PC in the high cost state case imply



























































− (1 − τ)rx
A
hl ≥ 0
Moreover, it can also be concluded that the PC for the high cost state of the world must
be binding. Indeed, if the last term is not equal to zero the government could decreased
the transfer to A by the same amount in both states (T A
ll and T A
hl) thus decreasing costs
and increasing its utility. But if this is the case then it means that the transfers and the


















− (1 − τ)rx
A
hl = 0
Finally, the ICC for the low cost type must also bind in the optimum. If it was not binding
then the government could decrease the transfer paid when in low cost state of the world
(T A
ll ) thus decreasing government costs and increasing its utility without breaking the PC of
28the low cost type or the ICC for the low cost type or the ICC for the high cost type which
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l the expression holds for xA
ll > xA
hl, that is, output is decreasing in the
cost. Moreover, if ICC for low cost is binding as is the PC for the high cost of the world
it can also be shown (by substituting the expressions for the transfers T A
hl and T A
ll obtained
from the ICC in the low cost state and the PC in the high cost state) that the ICC for the
high cost state of the world will not be binding at the optimum, and can be neglected.
The same procedure can be followed to determine the binding constraints for the case in
which A observes that B is of a high cost type and when applying the analysis to specialist
B.
29